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1. Introduction 
In the coming decades, industrialized countries will have to face large reductions in emissions 
of greenhouse gases (GHGs) to curb anthropogenic interference with the global climate 
system. This may be through restrictions stipulated in international agreements under the 
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change or through aspirational goals and 
voluntary reductions of individual countries. Norway is at the forefront of planning unilateral 
GHG reductions, with a goal of being “carbon neutral” by 2030. The EU has implemented 
legislative measures to cut emissions by 20 percent from 1990 levels by 2020; this reduction 
will increase to 30 percent if other industrialized countries follow. In the US and Canada, 
several states are involved in regional cap-and-trade programs, such as the Western Climate 
Initiative and the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative. California has taken a leadership role, 
with a goal of reducing GHG emissions by 80 percent by 2050, compared with 1990 levels. 
One expects that a variety of policy measures will be needed to achieve the cuts in GHGs. 
Most likely these will include a cap-and-trade system that gives a price to carbon emissions, 
like the European Trading Scheme, and a policy to improve clean energy technology like 
power production with carbon capture and storage (CCS). The most cost-efficient single 
policy to reduce emissions is an environmental policy that directly targets emissions, such as 
a tax or cap-and-trade system.1 However, in the presence of induced technological change and 
market failures in R&D, a combination of environmental and innovation policies may be 
more cost effective.2 Jaffe et al. (2005) argue that market failures associated with 
environmental pollution interact with market failures associated with the innovation and 
diffusion of new technologies. These combined market failures provide a strong rationale for 
a portfolio of public policies to foster emissions reductions as well as the development and 
adoption of environmentally beneficial technology. 
Key arguments for subsidizing innovation activities are external spillovers from previous 
R&D and love of capital variety in demand, combined with inefficiencies arising from 
imperfect competition in the capital variety market.3 The market inefficiencies imply that the 
private returns from environmental R&D are lower than the social returns, which leads to 
underinvestment in environmental R&D. This underinvestment is the rationale for subsidizing 
R&D activity. Several environmental economics R&D models include specific policies to 
target inefficiencies in innovation markets. A typical policy is providing a constant subsidy 
for R&D.4 However, the optimal subsidy rate would not necessarily be constant over time. 
Hart (2008) finds that the gap between social and private returns from R&D investments may 
vary across time along a transition path. He implements optimal second-best carbon taxes, 
which may be higher than the Pigouvian level outside the balanced growth path in order to 
encourage investment in emissions-saving technology at the expense of ordinary production 
technology. Hart (2008) does not study the implication this has for first-best environmental 
R&D subsidies. 
This paper adds to the literature by studying the timing and impact of environmental R&D 
subsidies when future emissions are limited, e.g., by a binding international agreement 
                                                     
1 See Schneider and Goulder (1997), Popp (2006), Parry et al. (2003). 
2 See Schneider and Goulder (1997), Goulder and Schneider (1999), Rosendahl (2004), Fischer and Newell (2008), 
Otto et al. (2006). 
3 See Jones and Williams (2000). 
4 See Gillingham et al. (2007) for a survey of induced technological change in climate policy modeling. 
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implemented via a carbon tax. In our model, emissions are reduced through a carbon tax that 
represents the full costs of emissions. This means that the R&D policy only targets innovation 
externalities, and not environmental externalities. We ask two questions. Firstly, we ask 
whether the welfare gains from environmental R&D subsidies are larger when the future costs 
of emissions are higher. Raising the costs of emissions causes an increase in the social value 
of R&D in environmental technologies. This may only partly be captured by private firms and 
thus change the welfare gains from subsidizing R&D. Secondly, we ask if welfare gains 
would be greater with heavy subsidization of environmental R&D in early periods, rather than 
subsidization at a constant level. This timing problem of R&D subsidies has not received 
much attention in the literature, to our knowledge. 
Rather than studying optimal policy directly, we focus on market responses to a set of 
policies. We study the welfare gains from subsidizing environmental R&D when emissions 
are reduced through a given set of carbon taxes. We find two results that are important when 
subsidizing environmental R&D in order to target inefficiencies in the research markets. 
Firstly, the welfare gains from R&D subsidies are larger when the emission reductions are 
larger. This is because stricter emissions reductions require a high carbon tax, which implies 
that the underinvestment in environmental R&D increases. When the underinvestment 
increases a subsidy to R&D gives more welfare. This result indicates that there is an 
interaction between the costs of emissions and the gains from subsidizing environmental 
R&D. This is not opposed to the conventional wisdom of de-linking climate policy from 
R&D policy, i.e., that in a first-best world, there should be a carbon tax to target the 
environmental externality and an R&D subsidy to correct for innovation externalities.5 Rather, 
the result means that optimal innovation policy is influenced by the carbon tax, since the tax 
influences the innovation externalities. Greaker and Rosendahl (2006) find a similar result in 
a three-stage game between the government, polluting industries, and suppliers of abatement 
technology. They find that an R&D subsidy is a strategic complement to a stringent 
environmental policy. The reason is that when environmental policy is more stringent, there is 
an increase in inefficiencies arising from imperfect competition in the supply of abatement 
technology. However, they do not take into account intertemporal inefficiencies, e.g., 
knowledge spillovers. 
Secondly, we find that the welfare gains are greater when there is a falling time profile for the 
subsidy rate for environmental R&D, rather than a constant or increasing rate, when the 
economy is subject to emissions restrictions. This means that, when facing increased carbon 
prices, it is better policy to subsidize environmental R&D more heavily initially than to 
distribute policy incentives evenly across time. The reason for this is that underinvestment is 
greatest in early periods. Gerlagh et al. (2008) also study the optimal timing of R&D 
subsidies; however, they study inefficiencies in the R&D market related to limited patent 
lifetime. In our model, patent lifetime is infinite and not the source of underinvestment in 
R&D. Externalities from knowledge spillovers—which are included in this paper—are not 
included in their study. They find that the externality related to finite patent lifetime makes 
the optimal R&D subsidy fall over time. The reason is that the value of abatement increases 
rapidly in the beginning as the carbon tax increases. The early innovators get a smaller share 
of the benefits from this increase than late innovators, since patent lifetime is finite. In another 
study, Kverndokk and Rosendahl (2007) find that optimal technology subsidies also decrease 
over time, since newly adopted technologies have higher spillovers than older technologies. 
                                                     
5 In a second-best situation where, e.g., only environmental policy, and not innovation policy, is set optimally, the de-linking 
breaks down. In this case, the innovation externalities call for an environmental tax that exceeds the Pigouvian level. See 
Parry (1995), Nordhaus (2002), and Hart (2007). 
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Their technology externalities, however, come from learning effects, as opposed to R&D 
externalities in our paper. When learning effects are present, the technology has to be 
implemented in order to reduce the future cost of the technology. This is not the case in R&D-
driven models, as the development of the technology can be separated from implementation. 
In such models, it is efficient to conduct R&D in early periods and implement the technology 
later, when costs are driven down. Goulder and Mathai (2000) show that the presence of R&D 
is an argument for delaying the implementation of abatement technology; the presence of 
“learning by doing”, on the other hand, may be an argument for immediate abatement action. 
In order to study quantitatively how future emissions reductions will influence the gains from 
subsidizing environmental R&D, we develop a dynamic CGE model with both general and 
specific environmental R&D. The model is theoretically founded in the product-variety model 
by Romer (1990), in which technological change happens as a result of patents by profit-
maximizing R&D firms. In addition, we take into consideration the high reliance of small, 
open economies on externally set international prices, competition, and growth. The case of a 
small, internationally exposed economy is exemplified by the Norwegian economy. 
Section 2 describes the CGE model and the simulation and calibration procedures. The policy 
effects and sensitivity tests are presented and discussed in Section 3. Section 4 concludes. 
2. The model 
2.1 General features 
The CGE model is a dynamic growth model with intertemporally optimizing firms and 
households. The model replicates a detailed industry structure with two R&D industries, two 
variety-capital industries (Romer’s intermediates industries) and 19 final goods industries6 
(one public, 18 private; see Appendix A for a list). The final goods industries deliver goods to 
each other according to the empirical input–output structure. Growth is perpetuated through 
dynamic spillovers from the accumulated knowledge stemming from R&D production, 
though with decreasing returns, as in Jones (1995). R&D production creates new patents. The 
patent production takes place in two industries, one directed toward general technology, and 
the other toward environmental technology. The patents are bought by firms in the two 
variety-capital industries. Each patent represents a fixed entry cost for a capital variety firm, 
and gives that firm a monopoly on the production of a separate capital variety. Due to love of 
capital variety, the productivity of variety capital within final goods industries increases with 
the number of capital variety firms. 
The model presented in this paper is an extension of that of Bye et al. (2007) in three 
dimensions. Firstly, GHG emissions are included. Emissions from both consumers and 
producers are subjected to a carbon tax that is set in accordance with an emissions-reduction 
target. Secondly, we develop a detailed electricity market with several power-producing 
industries. Finally, we include environmental R&D directed at improving the technology for 
clean power production. This environmental technology develops separately from general 
technology used by the other industries in the economy.7 
                                                     
6 The following industries are treated exogenously: the government sector, offshore production of oil and gas, pipeline 
transport, and ocean transport. 
7 Otto and Reilly (2006) develop a similar model but study different policy questions to ours. 
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The model fits a small, open economy and is applied to Norway. It gives a detailed 
description of the empirical tax, production, and final consumption structures. Labor is 
perfectly mobile within the country, but immobile internationally. Other inputs, including 
investment goods, are internationally traded at given world-market prices. Imports are 
modeled as imperfect substitutes for domestically produced goods (Armington function), and 
export deliveries as imperfect substitutes for home-market deliveries (constant elasticity of 
transformation—CET—technology). Both assumptions imply that the trade volumes are 
determined by the ratio of domestic to world-market prices. The world-market prices are 
exogenous, while domestic prices are determined by the respective market equilibriums. The 
interest rate is also externally given. Financial savings are endogenously determined, subject 
to a non-Ponzi game restriction that prevents foreign net wealth from exploding in the very 
long run. 
In the following, we broadly present key elements of the model structure, with functions and 
equations listed in Appendix B. See Bye et al. (2008) for a detailed description of the model. 
2.2 Industries 
Final goods industries 
We assume that all firms within the final goods industries are identical and take prices as 
given by the factor and goods markets, domestically and abroad. The technology of 
production is given by constant elasticity of substitution (CES) functions. The entire nested 
input factor tree of CES aggregates is presented in Appendix C. Each firm has perfect 
foresight and maximizes the present value of after-tax cash flow. This gives first-order 
conditions that equate prices with marginal costs for deliveries to the respective markets. 
Productivity changes in the final goods industries come from two sources, one foreign and 
one domestic. There is an exogenously driven factor-productivity change from abroad, which 
represents the adoption of international technological change. This is assumed to be neutral 
across factors and industries and to increase the efficient input of each factor. The domestic 
source of productivity change is the capital varieties used in production. The input of capital 
varieties is represented by so-called Spence-Dixit-Stiglitz (love-of-variety) preferences for 
variety. This means that the variety-capital productivity within final goods industries 
increases with the number of inputted varieties. 
Production of R&D services 
There are two R&D industries, one general and one environmental. The environmental 
technology in this study is exemplified by gas power production with CCS. This technology 
enables power production with low GHG emissions. More low-emissions technologies could 
have been included, but this is unnecessary for analyzing how the costs of emissions influence 
the impact and optimal timing of environmental R&D subsidies. Moreover, gas power 
production with CCS is a ‘hot’ technology in Norway, and plants with full-scale carbon 
extraction are close to realization. 
The general R&D industry delivers new patents to domestic firms that wish to enter the 
general variety-capital industry, while the environmental R&D industry delivers new patents 
to domestic firms that wish to enter the CCS variety-capital industry. The firms in the R&D 
industries have the same nested CES production technology as the final goods industries, 
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except that the R&D industries do not use the differentiated capital varieties.8 As for final 
goods production, the exogenous change in factor productivity captures the adoption of 
international technological change. In addition, productivity is enhanced by endogenous 
domestic spillovers that are freely accessible by all incumbent and potential patent producers. 
These originate from the accumulated stock of knowledge. This stock of knowledge grows 
with the production of new patents. However, the elasticity of scale related to previous 
knowledge means that the spillover effects of the knowledge base decrease with time. This 
means that the productivity gain for future R&D from a new patent is declining as the 
knowledge stock grows. There are no spillovers in knowledge between general and 
environmental R&D. 
All firms in the two R&D industries are identical and take prices as given in factor and output 
markets. Each firm has perfect foresight and maximizes the present value of the after-tax cash 
flow. This gives first-order conditions that equate domestic prices with marginal costs. 
Production of capital varieties 
As for the R&D industries, there are two capital-variety industries, general and 
environmental. Each firm producing capital variety buys one patent from one of the R&D 
industries as a fixed establishment cost, and produces one capital variety that is based on the 
patent. The general industry delivers capital varieties to all final goods industries except the 
gas power industry with CCS. The directed environmental industry delivers only to the gas 
power industry with CCS. We assume that the cost structure is identical for all the firms 
within the industries. As for the R&D industries, we exclude variety capital as a production 
factor. Technological change from abroad is accounted for through the exogenous 
productivity change, therefore we do not allow for additional productivity growth through the 
import of capital varieties. 
The capital-variety firms have market power in the domestic market. This gives a monopoly-
pricing rule that is a markup factor above marginal costs. The firms exhibit no market power 
in the export market, where prices are externally given. This is a reasonable assumption for a 
small, open economy. Each firm has perfect foresight and maximizes the present value of 
after-tax cash flow. 
The patent price in each period (establishment cost) is determined from the free-entry 
condition in the capital-variety markets. Firms enter their respective capital-variety industry 
until the representative firm’s total discounted net profit equals the entry cost. In each period, 
new patents are produced and new firms will enter the variety-capital industries. 
Production of electricity 
There are three power-producing industries: hydropower, gas power without CCS, and gas 
power with CCS. These three industries are modeled like the other final goods industries, with 
three exceptions. Firstly, they produce the same good, namely electricity, with a homogenous 
price. Sale of electricity to demanders is organized by the distribution industry. This industry 
charges distribution and transmission costs that may vary between demanders. Secondly, the 
net export of electricity is exogenous. This means that the price of electricity is set in the 
domestic market. Thirdly, the production of hydropower is exogenous. Since the unit cost of 
production in hydropower is relatively low, this industry earns high profits, which are to be 
understood as a natural resource rent that is committed to taxation. 
                                                     
8 This choice is made to avoid cumulative multipliers of the love-of-variety effect. 
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The gas power industries adjust their production according to normal optimization. To avoid 
zero production in one of these industries—arising from their having unequal production 
costs—we assume that gas power with and without CCS are close but imperfect substitutes.9 
The total supply of electricity from gas power production is a CES aggregate of gas power 
with and without CCS. 
2.3 Emissions 
Emissions of GHGs10 are based on factor inputs to consumer activities and production in all 
industries. The use of factor inputs is converted into emissions according to activity- and 
industry-specific technical parameters, see Bye et al. (2008). Emissions are converted into 
CO2 equivalents, and a uniform tax is imposed on them. This carbon tax can be seen as either 
a direct tax or a quota price in a well functioning market. Either way, the tax can be thought 
of as representing the marginal costs of emissions for the economy, where the costs may 
result from international agreements or domestic targets. The environmental impacts of 
emissions are not included in the model. 
2.4 Consumer behavior 
Consumption and saving result from the decisions of a representative consumer with an 
infinite lifetime who maximizes intertemporal utility with perfect foresight. The consumer 
chooses a consumption path subject to an intertemporal budget constraint that requires the 
present value of consumption not to exceed total wealth (present non-human wealth plus the 
present value of labor income and net transfers). The labor supply is exogenous. We assume 
that the consumer’s rate of time preference equals the exogenously given nominal interest rate 
for the entire time path. Total consumption is allocated across 10 different goods and services 
according to a nested CES structure. The structure is given in Figure D.1, Appendix D. 
2.5 Equilibrium conditions 
The model is characterized by equilibrium in each period in all product markets and the labor 
market. It also incorporates a detailed account of the revenues and expenditures of the 
government. The government produces services and purchases intermediates from the 
industries and abroad. Changes in government budgets are neutralized by lump-sum transfers. 
Intertemporal equilibrium requires fulfillment of two transversality conditions: the limits of 
the total discounted values of net foreign debt and real capital must both be zero. The model is 
characterized by a path-dependent balanced growth path solution (or steady-state solution). 
This implies that both the path and the long-run stationary solution differ between simulated 
scenarios. 
                                                     
9 This is technically motivated: it is to avoid problems connected with zero production when solving the model. 
10 The GHGs included in the model are: carbon dioxide, methane, nitrous oxide, sulfur hexafluoride, hydrofluorocarbons, 
and perfluorocarbons. 
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2.6 Data and parameters 
The model is calibrated to the 2002 Norwegian National Accounts. The elasticity of 
substitution between the different capital varieties is assumed to be 5.0, giving a markup 
factor of 1.25 for the domestic price of capital varieties.11 The elasticity of scale related to 
previous knowledge is equal to 0.4, in order to ensure decreasing spillover effects of the 
knowledge base, supported by both theoretical and empirical findings (see Jones, 1995 and 
1999; Leahy and Neary, 1999). See Appendix B.6 for an overview of elasticities of 
substitution and other parameter values. 
The technical parameters that calculate emissions from factor inputs and consumer activities 
are taken from Strøm (2007). Emissions are spread over industries and consumers in line with 
Strøm (2007), which gives total emissions from the Norwegian economy in 2002 
corresponding to 56.1 million tonnes of CO2 equivalents. 
In 2008, there is one gas power plant in operation and one under construction in the 
Norwegian economy.12 Several other plants are planned. Not one of these plants will initially 
incorporate CCS technology. However, the political majority in Norway have aspirational 
goals of gas power production with low GHG emissions. Therefore, the plants have 
timetables for the eventual full-scale extraction of CO2 13. These plans to implement CCS 
technology are joint projects with the government, energy producers, and potential suppliers 
of CCS technology. It is unclear how the costs of implementing and developing the 
technology will be shared between the parties. 
To roughly reflect the Norwegian situation, the model is calibrated to include two 860 
megawatt gas power plants, one with CCS and one without CCS. The production costs of gas 
power in our calibration are based on Statoil (2005).14 Basically, capital and operating costs 
are doubled for a CCS plant compared with a non-CCS plant, and the required gas input is 
about 20 percent larger for a CCS plant. See Appendix E for more information on costs and 
prices in the gas power industry. 
The Norwegian National Accounts lack a good exposition of R&D costs and production, so 
we use specific R&D statistics. See Bye et al. (2008) for more details. The share of R&D 
targeting CCS technology is set to match the share of variant capital used by the gas power 
industry with CCS relative to the total production of capital variants in the economy.15 
                                                     
11 This is in line with the Jones and Williams (2000) computations, which exclude creative destruction, similar to our model. 
Numerical specifications of Romer’s Cobb–Douglas production functions, as in Diao et al. (1999) and Lin and Russo 
(2002), result in far larger markups. Markup factors of 1.25 are nevertheless in the upper bound of econometric estimates 
(Norrbin, 1993; Basu, 1996). Our motivation for staying in the upper bound area is the fact that the capital varieties 
represent a small share of machinery capital and, thus, of total inputs. This, in isolation, drives up the markups required to 
calibrate the model. 
12 The plant in operation is at the Kårstø industrial facility; the one under construction is at Mongstad. In addition, gas power 
is used in specific industries offshore and in processing. This power is geared toward processes in the industries, not the 
electricity market. In the model, this power production is not separated from the user industries. 
13 CCS technology is planned to be operational by 2011 at Kårstø and 2014 at Mongstad. 
14 Statoil (2005) bases costs on combined-cycle power plants with amine-based post-combustion separation of CO2. Reduced 
energy efficiency, pipeline transport, and storage in geographic formations are included in the costs. 
15 This R&D production, from the environmental R&D industry, is quite low in the base year, about US$35 million, and is in 
line with information obtained from the Norwegian Research Council. 
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2.7 Business-as-usual path and balanced growth 
Along the business-as-usual path (BAU), the exogenous growth factors are assumed to grow 
at a constant rate. In most cases, rates are set in accordance with the average annual growth 
estimates in the baseline scenario of Norwegian Ministry of Finance (2004), which reports the 
government’s economic predictions until 2050. In the government’s evaluation, total factor 
productivity growth is entirely exogenous and valued at, on average, 1.0 percent annually. 
Our model distinguishes between exogenous and endogenous factor productivity components. 
In line with empirical findings (see, e.g., Coe and Helpman, 1995; Keller, 2004), we ascribe 
90 percent of domestic total factor productivity growth to the exogenous diffusion of 
international technological change; the remaining 10 percent is the result of domestic R&D.16 
The latter forms a basis for calibrating the 2002 level of knowledge,17 which, together with the 
remaining parameters of the model, determines the productivity growth from domestic 
knowledge accumulation. The international nominal interest rate is 4 percent. All policy 
variables are constant in real terms at their 2002 levels. 
In the long run, i.e., 60–70 years from now, the economy reaches stationary growth rates. The 
GDP grows by 1.5 percent annually; consumption grows 0.5 percentage points lower, as net 
exports are increasing more in this period. The 10 percent contribution from the endogenous 
productivity impact of domestic innovations requires a relatively strong growth in general 
R&D production and the generation of new general varieties: both grow about 3 percent 
annually.18 
In the period up to 2070, the demand for electricity increases substantially. Most of this is 
covered by gas power without CCS. Gas power with CCS does not grow, as the production 
costs are relatively high when the carbon tax faced by the gas power industry without CCS is 
low. This leads to low demand for the environmental capital varieties, which again leads to 
low production in the environmental R&D industry. The low level of investment in 
environmental R&D yields poor productivity growth in the gas power industry with CCS, and 
increases the cost difference between power production with and without CCS. Note that gas 
power without CCS experiences the general productivity growth from general R&D, and that 
there is no spillover between general and environmental R&D in the model. 
The uniform carbon tax replaces a variety of taxes on GHGs in the Norwegian economy. It is 
set at about US$16 per tonne of CO2 equivalents (US$16/tCO2) to replicate baseline 
emissions in 2002 of 56.1 million tonnes of CO2 equivalents. Emissions rise substantially 
through the period to 92.0 million tonnes in 2050 and 120.5 million tonnes in 2070. About 16 
percent of the increase in emissions comes from the gas power industry. 
                                                     
16 Ten percent from domestic R&D is in the lower bound of estimates for small, open countries like Norway. We have 
chosen this lower-bound estimate because several mechanisms believed to drive domestic innovations are excluded from 
the model, like basic government research, endogenous education, learning-by-doing, and an extension of the direct 
absorptive capacity related to R&D. 
17 The environmental knowledge stock is set so that it grows at the same rate as the general knowledge stock when the two 
gas power industries demand equal amounts of capital varieties. Since both knowledge stocks are indexed to unity in the 
base year, this means that an equal growth in the knowledge stocks gives the same productivity increase in the use of 
general and environmental capital variants. See Bye et al. (2008) for more details. 
18 Eventually, in the distant future (after about 90 years), all exogenous and endogenous growth mechanisms are cut off. This 
is technically motivated, in order to ensure that the economy is on a balanced growth path (steady state) and that this 
growth path satisfies the transversality conditions described in Section 2.5. The relative effects of the different policy 
analyses are independent of this assumption. 
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3. Policy analyses and numerical results 
We explore how innovation incentives should be designed when future emissions are limited. 
The reason for subsidizing R&D comes from two distortions in the innovation markets. 
Firstly, there are knowledge spillovers in the production of patents. The production of patents 
contributes to the knowledge stock, which lowers the cost of future R&D. These knowledge 
spillovers are freely accessible to all R&D firms. Secondly, the capital variety producers 
engage in monopolistic competition, giving rise to the surplus appropriability problem. The 
capital variety firms are unable to appropriate the entire “consumer surplus” from the goods 
they sell. Thus, the price of patents facing the R&D firms is lower than the socially optimal 
price, since the former price is equal to the present discounted value of a capital variety firm 
holding a patent. 19 
Rather than studying optimal policy directly, we focus on market responses to a set of 
policies. In particular, we study the timing and welfare impact of environmental R&D 
subsidies when the future price of carbon is high. To do that, we establish two carbon 
reduction regimes, one high and one low. The two regimes represent different carbon costs 
facing the economy through the carbon tax. We simulate several distinct innovation policy 
alternatives on the two reduction regimes. The focus is on the welfare gain from subsidies to 
the environmental R&D industry. The policy alternatives are constant innovation policy, 
falling innovation policy, and increasing innovation policy. In the simulations, all the policy 
alternatives are implemented through ad valorem subsidy rates to the R&D industry. To make 
the distinct policy alternatives comparable, the subsidy rates are dimensioned so that the 
present discounted values of the subsidies are equal. The public revenue annuity is 
approximately US$9 million, which is about one-fourth of the total environmental R&D effort 
by the R&D industry in 2002. 
3.1 The carbon reduction regimes 
The carbon reduction regimes give two different paths for the costs of emissions. In the high 
carbon reduction regime, we impose a carbon tax that corresponds to a 25 percent reduction in 
national GHG emissions by 2050, compared with BAU. In the low carbon reduction regime, 
the carbon tax is lower and corresponds to a 15 percent reduction. We implement this by a 
linear increase of the carbon tax until it reaches a stable level in 2050. The carbon tax starts at 
the BAU level in 2002, i.e., US$16/tCO2, and increases to about US$140/tCO2 in 2050 in the 
high carbon reduction regime, and about US$68/tCO2 in the low carbon reduction regime. For 
the rest of the simulated period, the tax is kept constant. The carbon tax is a first-best policy 
instrument to achieve the emissions reductions, i.e., it does not target any other market 
failures. The carbon tax is not under the influence of policy makers when innovation policy is 
decided; underinvestment in R&D is addressed solely through the R&D subsidies. All other 
exogenous inputs are the same as in BAU. 
Domestic emissions reductions can be achieved through factor substitution, emission 
abatement in gas power production (by CCS), or by general factor productivity growth. CCS 
is the only abatement technology available in the power market in this study, and we do not 
include other specific energy-saving technological changes, such as low-emissions vehicles or 
increased energy efficiency in buildings. 
                                                     
19 See Jones and Williams (2000). 
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The long-run effects of the carbon reduction regimes, measured as percentage deviations from 
BAU, are given in Table 1. 
Table 1: Long-run effects of the carbon reduction regimes, given as percentage deviations from 
the BAU path in 2070 
Carbon reduction regime → High carbon reduction 
regime 
Low carbon reduction 
regime 
Emissions reduction in 2050 25 15 
GHG emissions in 2050 in actual 
millions of tonnes of CO2 equivalents 
69.0* 78.2* 
Production of general patents 16.2 7.3 
Production of environmental patents 84.6 54.5 
General knowledge stock 6.9 3.1 
Environmental knowledge stock 22.0 15.0 
Production of general capital varieties 6.41 2.8 
Production of environmental capital 
varieties 
36.6 25.8 
Production of gas power without CCS –99.3 –74.3 
Production of gas power with CCS 53.3 46.2 
Production of main final goods –0.207 –0.035 
Production of power-intensive goods –37.6 –19.8 
Nominal wage rate –1.6 –0.8 
Gross domestic product (GDP)20 –0.095 –0.077 
Welfare21 –0.058 –0.015 
CO2 tax, actual value in US$/tCO2 140† 68† 
*Millions of tonnes of CO2 equivalents; †Value in US$/tCO2. 
                                                     
20 This includes returns from the factors labor, capital, and knowledge, and excludes exogenous, offshore petroleum 
production. 
21 Welfare is measured as the present value of utility in the period 2002–2070. 
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As the carbon tax increases, gas power production uses more CCS technology. The demand 
for environmental R&D investment increases, improving the productivity growth in the CCS 
power industry. However, the total costs of electricity production increase since the carbon 
tax increases costs for gas power production without CCS. This leads to a reduction in the 
production of electricity. The carbon tax paid on emissions combined with the increased price 
of electricity induces a fall in the power-intensive sector. This frees resources in the economy 
like labor and capital goods, and so labor costs decrease. The total effect of the higher carbon 
tax and changed input costs differs between industries, depending on their carbon and energy 
intensities. Both R&D industries and capital variety industries experience reduced costs, and 
the production of patents and capital varieties increase. This yields productivity gains through 
an increased level of technology and contributes to offset some of the overall costs of the 
carbon tax. Production in the main final goods industry is almost unchanged from BAU. Both 
the welfare and GDP reductions from the emissions reductions are modest. 
3.2 The innovation policy alternatives 
We implement three different innovation policy alternatives for each of the carbon reduction 
regimes. The alternatives are all subsidies for environmental R&D, but with constant, falling, 
or increasing time profiles on the subsidy rates. The carbon tax does not change between the 
subsidy alternatives. We do this in order to analyze the effect of different subsidy policies 
given a set carbon price, e.g., determined in an international carbon market.22 The long-run 
effects, measured as percentage changes caused by the innovation policies in the high and low 
carbon reduction regimes, are given in Table 2. 
Table 2: Long-run effects of different time profiles for environmental R&D subsidy rates, 
given as percentage changes for each carbon reduction regime in 2070 
Innovation policy  
Constant Falling Increasing 
Carbon reduction regime → High Low High Low High Low 
Production of general patents –0.8 –0.8 –0.7 –0.7 –0.8 –0.8 
Production of environmental patents 188.5 202.1 166.3 160.8 174.0 190.0 
General knowledge stock –0.3 –0.3 –0.3 –0.3 –0.2 –0.2 
Environmental knowledge stock 61.4 63.7 71.0 69.0 43.8 47.1 
Production of general capital varieties –0.3 –0.3 –0.3 –0.3 –0.3 –0.3 
Production of environmental capital 
varieties 
58.6 60.9 66.1 64.3 43.3 46.7 
Production of gas power without CCS –9.6 –4.2 –10.9 –4.6 –7.1 –3.2 
                                                     
22 In the results reported, the carbon tax is not changed when environmental R&D is subsidized. This leads to a change in the 
carbon emissions when the policy alternatives are implemented. We have done similar simulations where we keep 
emissions constant so that the carbon tax changes when the innovation policy alternatives are implemented. This does not 
change any of our results. See Appendix F, Table F.2. 
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Production of gas power with CCS 5.8 6.6 6.6 7.2 4.2 5.0 
Production of main final goods –0.02 –0.02 –0.02 –0.02 –0.02 –0.02 
Production of power-intensive goods 0.27 0.21 0.32 0.24 0.20 0.15 
Nominal wage rate 0.04 0.03 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.03 
Electricity price –1.01 –0.77 –1.15 –0.84 –0.74 –0.59 
GDP 0.057 0.053 0.064 0.055 0.041 0.040 
Welfare 0.0303 0.0266 0.0327 0.0273 0.0242 0.0218 
 
3.2.1 The constant innovation policy 
We first consider the case with a constant subsidy rate.23 The reported results are for the long 
run and relative to the two carbon reduction regimes without subsidies for environmental 
R&D. 
Effects on production 
The subsidy given to producers of new patents in the environmental R&D industry pushes 
down the marginal costs of environmental R&D production. For a given patent price, supply 
increases, and for the environmental capital-variety industry to be able to absorb more 
patents, the price of patents must fall. The marginal willingness to pay for patents is 
determined by the discounted profit for the last new firm entering the capital industry. More 
patents in the industry means more firms. As a result, production by each firm falls as a 
proportion of the given total industry production, and thus individual firm profits fall. The 
marginal costs of the environmental R&D firms will be further shifted downward because of 
dynamic, positive spillover effects from the accumulated environmental knowledge stock, and 
this reinforces the partial market dynamics. In the long-run equilibrium, the environmental 
R&D production more or less triples. The number of patents, and thus the environmental 
knowledge stock, also increases considerably. 
In the market for CCS variety-capital, the demand faced by each variety firm shifts downward 
as the number of varieties increases. This reduces both the markup price and the domestic 
production of each variety. The increased number of patents for CCS technology will increase 
the efficiency of using the capital composite. This love of capital variety in the gas power 
industry with CCS, combined with the price effect, increases the overall demand for 
environmental capital varieties. 
Improvement in CCS technology decreases the costs of gas power production with CCS, and 
the production increases. Gas power production without CCS decreases from the already-low 
level because of the carbon tax. The total effect is that overall gas power production increases, 
and the electricity price falls. 
                                                     
23 All subsidies are phased out in 2090, at the same time the endogenous growth mechanism is turned off. 
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Reallocation and welfare 
The results reported above are influenced by indirect changes in all factor markets. The R&D 
subsidy increases demand in both the environmental R&D industry and the environmental 
variety-capital industry for other inputs, like labor, intermediates, and other investment goods. 
Combined with higher final consumption, this contributes to a rise in all factor prices except 
variety capital and electricity. The power-intensive industry benefits strongly from a decrease 
in the costs of power production and increases its production. For most of the remaining 
industries, the unit costs of production increase, and production falls in both the short and 
long run. This includes the general R&D industry, since production here uses the same factor 
inputs as the subsidized environmental R&D industry. Thus, general R&D is affected worse 
than other industries by the expansion of environmental R&D. In both carbon reduction 
regimes, general R&D falls by 0.8 percent, while the large main final goods industry falls 
only marginally. General capital variety production is also reduced and the general knowledge 
stock is lowered. The total effect on the economy is a GDP increase of 0.05–0.06 percent. 
Welfare increases by 0.030 and 0.027 percent in the high and low carbon reduction regimes, 
respectively. Welfare increases because the subsidy for environmental R&D targets 
externalities connected to knowledge spillovers and the surplus appropriability problem. The 
main contributions to welfare gain in our model come from increased environmental R&D 
and environmental variety-capital production through two channels: the positive spillover 
effect in patent production of a larger environmental knowledge stock, and the positive love-
of-variety effect in the demand for variety capital as the number of capital varieties increases. 
These are counteracted by two negative effects: the welfare loss through lower production 
within each monopoly firm producing capital varieties, and the negative contribution from 
higher overall fixed entry costs in terms of patent expenditures. 
The welfare increase is larger in the high carbon reduction regime than in the low one. This 
indicates that higher costs of emissions, through a higher carbon tax, lead to larger innovation 
externalities. Larger externalities imply that the underinvestment in environmental R&D 
increases, and so the subsidy for environmental R&D gives a greater welfare gain (see the 
discussion in Section 3.3). 
3.2.2 The falling innovation policy 
To analyze the effect of the time profile of subsidies, we next consider a falling subsidy for 
environmental R&D production in the two carbon reduction regimes. The subsidy rate is high 
in the first years and decreases linearly until it ceases in 2090. The present value of 
government spending on innovation policy is the same in all the three innovation policy 
alternatives. 
The subsidy increases long-run environmental R&D production considerably, but not as much 
as in the constant innovation policy alternative. The reason is that in the latter, the long-run 
subsidy rate for environmental R&D is considerably higher. Halfway through the study 
period, however, the increase in environmental R&D production is larger under the falling 
innovation policy than the constant innovation policy, so the environmental knowledge stock 
is developed earlier. Under the falling innovation policy, the long-run environmental 
knowledge stock increases by about 70 percent in both carbon reduction regimes. The 
production of environmental capital varieties increases by about 65 percent. Both these 
increases are larger than those under the constant innovation policy. By having larger 
subsidies early on, the technology is more rapidly developed and the costs of producing 
patents in later periods are more greatly reduced through the spillover effect. 
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The total effect on the economy is a GDP increase of about 0.06 percent. Welfare increases by 
0.033 and 0.027 percent in the high and low carbon reduction regimes, respectively. Both 
GDP and welfare increase slightly more with falling subsidies than with constant subsidies for 
a given carbon reduction regime. The reason for this is that the innovation externalities are 
large in early periods. This means that underinvestment in environmental R&D is larger in 
early periods (see the discussion in Section 3.3). 
3.2.3 The increasing innovation policy 
Finally, we consider an increasing time profile for environmental R&D subsidies in the two 
carbon reduction regimes. The subsidy rate is low in the early years and then increases 
linearly throughout time. As with the other innovation policies, the subsidy ceases in 2090. 
The long-run increase in environmental R&D production lies between the increases for the 
constant innovation and falling innovation policies. The environmental knowledge stock, 
however, is lowest for the increasing innovation policy, with an increase of less than 
50 percent. Because of a slower start, the environmental knowledge stock is not as rapidly 
developed, and the costs of environmental R&D production stay higher throughout the study 
period. Smaller spillovers lead to slower accumulation of patents and higher costs for power 
production with CCS technology. 
The total effect on the economy is a GDP increase of about 0.04 percent. Welfare increases by 
0.024 and 0.022 percent in the high and low carbon reduction regimes, respectively. Both 
GDP and welfare increase less with increasing subsidies than with falling or constant 
subsidies. The reason for this is that an increasing subsidy rate fails to correct for the 
underinvestment in environmental R&D in early periods. 
3.3 Comparison of the policy alternatives in the different emissions reduction 
regimes 
An R&D subsidy to increase innovations is intended to correct for underinvestment in R&D 
originating from innovation externalities.24 A carbon tax above the marginal costs of 
emissions could also target underinvestment in R&D. This is not the case in our study, as the 
carbon tax only represents the costs of emissions for the economy and does not target 
innovation externalities. The carbon tax may, however, influence the underinvestment in 
environmental R&D through its effect on the demand for clean gas power technology. The 
level of welfare gain from R&D subsidies is not the same for the two emissions reduction 
regimes. This indicates that underinvestment in R&D does not stay the same for different 
carbon tax levels. 
R&D induced by a subsidy gives a higher welfare gain for the economy when the initial 
underinvestment in R&D is large. In stating this, we have implicitly assumed that the 
economy gets more welfare out of correcting for the first dollar of a large underinvestment 
than from the first dollar of a small underinvestment. In other words, the marginal social 
returns from R&D investments increase with the level of underinvestment. The welfare gains 
from the innovation policy alternatives in the two carbon reduction regimes are given in 
Figure 1. 
                                                     
24 When the social (welfare) optimal level of investment is greater than the actual private investment, the difference is called 
“underinvestment”. In this context, we mean by investment the actual dollars invested (or not) in a particular year of the 
model. The social and private levels of investment in a year depend on the rates of return on the investment. In this study, 
we do not measure relative rates of return, only the absolute levels of underinvestment. 
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Figure 1: Welfare effects of innovation policy alternatives, measured as percentage changes 
for each carbon reduction regime 
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We see that the welfare changes are larger in the high carbon reduction regime than in the low 
carbon reduction regime for a given innovation policy. The differences in welfare gain from 
introducing the subsidies stem from differences in underinvestment in environmental R&D. 
This means that it is more important to subsidize the environmental R&D industry when the 
costs of emissions, through the carbon tax, are higher. This leads to the first result: 
Result 1: The welfare gain from subsidizing environmental R&D increases with the costs of 
emissions, since the level of underinvestment increases with the carbon tax. 
The underinvestment increases because a higher carbon tax means larger returns from carbon-
saving technology that are not internalized fully by the private R&D firms. One of the reasons 
for the underinvestment is knowledge spillovers from environmental R&D. When the carbon 
tax is higher, the value of gas power production with CCS goes up relative to production in 
other sectors. This increases demand for CCS technology, which again increases demand for 
environmental R&D. The individual R&D firms do not take into account that their activity 
reduces the costs of future R&D. Thus, the increased investment in R&D under a high carbon 
tax because of stronger demand is lower than the increase in the social optimal investment 
level. 
Another reason for the underinvestment is that the environmental capital varieties producing 
firms do not take into account the full value of the carbon-saving technology for the gas 
power industry. Since the environmental capital varieties producers cannot reap the full 
benefit from the increasing number of varieties through the love-of-variety effect in the CCS 
gas power industry, the price of patents does not reflect the full value of ideas. This surplus 
appropriability problem is larger when the carbon tax is higher, since a higher tax increases 
the value of abatement technology. The effects from both the surplus appropriability and the 
knowledge spillovers mean that the higher carbon tax results in increased social returns from 
environmental R&D. These are not fully covered by an increase in the private returns from 
R&D. Thus, the underinvestment in environmental R&D increases. 
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In both carbon reduction regimes, the level of welfare is higher for the falling innovation 
policy than for the other policies. This indicates that the underinvestment in environmental 
R&D decreases over time, since a subsidy gives a larger welfare gain when the 
underinvestment is larger. This leads to the second result: 
Result 2: There is a greater welfare gain from a falling time profile of subsidy rates for 
environmental R&D than from constant or increasing time profiles when the economy faces 
increased emissions costs. This is because the level of underinvestment is larger in the 
beginning of the period than the end. 
The reason for this time difference in underinvestment is that the knowledge externalities 
from R&D are largest in early periods. There are two explanations for this. Firstly, early R&D 
investments contribute over a longer time period. In other words, knowledge generated early 
spills over to a larger number of later periods, compared with knowledge generated later. 
These spillovers are ignored by the private firms, and therefore the underinvestment is larger 
in early time periods. Secondly, there is a declining increase in the benefit from new ideas 
(i.e., concave curves) in both the R&D production function and the love-of-variety 
component. This means that R&D activity has a larger impact on the economy when the 
knowledge stock is small. As the knowledge stock grows over time, there are fewer spillovers 
and productivity gains from new ideas. Thus, the innovation externalities are smaller in the 
later periods and the underinvestment is falling over time. 
However, the welfare gain from a falling time profile of subsidies compared with constant 
subsidies is larger in the high carbon reduction regime than in the low carbon reduction 
regime. Combining results 1 and 2 explains this. Result 1 implies that the value of spillovers 
from investments in all periods increases with the carbon tax level. Result 2 implies that early 
investments yield spillovers over more periods than later investments do, and therefore the 
total value of spillovers from early investments increases more compared with that from later 
investments when the carbon tax increases. This is why the time difference in 
underinvestment is larger when the carbon tax is higher. 
3.5 Sensitivity analyses 
3.5.1 Constant carbon tax regime 
In the carbon reduction regimes, the emissions are restricted through a carbon tax that 
increases over time. To analyze whether this is a driving mechanism for our result regarding 
the timing of subsidies for environmental R&D, we construct a carbon tax regime with a 
constant carbon tax. The carbon tax is imposed on the BAU path in the first year of simulation 
and kept constant throughout the simulation period. The constant carbon tax is the same as the 
average tax in the high carbon reduction regime and gives approximately the same 
accumulated emissions reduction. The welfare gain from environmental R&D subsidies are 
0.030 percent for the constant innovation policy, 0.032 percent for the falling innovation 
policy, and 0.024 percent for the increasing innovation policy. The ranking of the innovation 
policy alternatives does not change when the carbon tax is constant. Hence, we conclude that 
it is the overall carbon tax level and not the time profile of the tax that is the driving 
mechanism for our results.25 
                                                     
25 See Appendix F, Table F.1. 
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4. Concluding remarks 
Facing the increasing costs of GHG emissions, an important policy question is how to 
stimulate innovation in environmental R&D. Stimulation of innovation gives welfare gains, 
since private firms do not reap the full benefits of their R&D activities. An appropriate policy 
instrument to correct for the externalities in innovation is an R&D subsidy. We ask whether 
the benefits of such a subsidy are influenced by the costs of emissions, and whether 
environmental R&D should be subsidized more heavily in early periods. We find two results 
that point toward a specific policy on environmental R&D. Firstly, the welfare gain from 
subsidizing environmental R&D increases with the costs of emissions. This means that when 
the price of carbon increases, e.g., through international carbon markets or domestic reduction 
programs, it is more important to have an active innovation policy to promote environmental 
R&D. The reason for this is that the carbon tax increase raises the social (efficient) investment 
level in environmental R&D that is not fully covered by an increase in private investment in 
R&D because of externalities in the innovation process. Secondly, the welfare gain is greatest 
from a falling time profile of subsidy rates for environmental R&D, rather than a constant or 
increasing profile, when the economy faces emissions restrictions. This means that when 
faced with a future price on carbon, it is a better policy to take R&D action now than to 
distribute policy incentives evenly across time. The reason for this is that the innovation 
externalities are larger in early periods. 
Further research is needed to analyze the mechanisms that influence the interaction between 
the carbon tax and underinvestment in environmental R&D, both theoretical and empirical. 
Specifically, it may be fruitful to research optimal subsidy profiles in theoretical models under 
different carbon tax scenarios, with a focus on the development of social and private rates of 
return from R&D. The maturity of different technologies may also be interesting to explore. It 
may be that new technologies have larger knowledge spillovers than older technologies, 
where most advances have already been exploited. This would give another argument for an 
active R&D policy toward new environmental technologies. 
There is potential to add to the model many new features that are empirically significant and 
relevant to the effects of innovation policies. First of all, the modeling of knowledge 
spillovers may be made richer. Including spillovers between general technological 
development and the specific environmental technological development could diminish the 
gains from early subsidies to environmental R&D, as the technology would benefit from early 
increases in the general knowledge stock. Linking domestic R&D to the absorption capacity 
for international knowledge spillovers could increase the gains from R&D and amplify the 
effects of the subsidy alternatives. On the other hand, the foreign technological change in 
environmental technology may be as large as, or larger than, the domestic, which would offset 
some of the gain from engaging in domestic environmental R&D early. Further, the 
assumptions about labor supply have crucial implications for innovation policies. The present 
model assumes one national labor market with exogenous, unaltered labor supply across all 
the policy alternatives. The welfare potential of innovation policy is restricted by limited 
resources, in particular the inflexible labor resources. Expansion of the R&D industries is 
likely to attract mainly high-skilled labor. In reality, therefore, the allocation effect of 
increasing innovation in one R&D industry would be to crowd out the other R&D industries 
even more than in the present framework. 
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Appendix A 
Table A.1: Production sectors in the model 
ITC Code Production Sectors 
20 Other commodities and services 
30 Power-intensive industry 
32 Polluting transport 
33 Non-polluting transport 
38G General research and development (R&D) 
38E Energy research and development (R&D) 
40 Refining 
46G General machinery varieties 
46E Energy machinery varieties 
47 Other machinery 
50 Ships, oil rigs, and oil-production platforms 
55 Construction, excl. oil-well drilling 
60 Ocean transport, and oil and gas exploration and drilling 
701 Electricity from hydropower 
704 Electricity from gas power without CCS 
705 Electricity from gas power with CCS 
74 Transmission and distribution of electricity 
83 Building services 
90 Central and local government 
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Appendix B 
The model structure of firm and household behavior 
When firm notation i is suppressed, all variables in the equation apply to firm i. Subscripts denoting 
industry are also suppressed for most variables. Subscripts 0, -1, or t denote periods. When period 
specification is absent, all variables apply to the same period. In consumption, i denotes good i, and j 
denotes CES composite j. 
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B.2 Production of ideas 
The two R&D industries, general and environmental, are not separated in this exposition. This is 
because the two industries work the same way. The same applies to the variety-capital industries 
below. Equations (B.1) and (B.8) apply to firms within the R&D industries. In addition, the following 
structure describes the industries: 
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B.3 Production of capital varieties 
For firms producing capital varieties, Eq. (B.2) applies, in addition to the following: 
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B.4 Consumer behavior 
(B.16) ( ) dteduU tt ρ−
∞
∫=
0
0  
(B.17) 
⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
−
−
=
d
d
ddu
d
d
t
σ
σ
σ
σ
1
1
)(  
(B.18) dtedPDW rttt
−
∞
∫=
0
0  
(B.19) [ ] dtt PDd σλ −⋅=  
(B.20) ttt ndD )1( +=  
 25
(B.21) 
jt
jt
j
it
jt
iit PD
VD
PD
PD
D
σ
ω ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
= 0.  
(B.22) ( )( )s
t
t gn
D
D
++=+ 111  
B.5 Variable list 
0PV  The present value of the representative firm 
π  Operating profit 
JP  Price index of the investment good composite 
J  Gross investment 
KP  User cost index of capital composite 
K  Capital composite 
XH Output of final good firm delivered to the domestic market 
XW Output of final good firm delivered to the export market 
PH Domestic market price index of final good 
PW World market price index of final good 
W Wage rate 
L  Labor 
VK  Variety capital 
MK  Other ordinary capital 
C The variable cost function 
c Price index of the CES-aggregate of production factors 
'π  Modified profit  
kMδ  Share of other ordinary capital in the capital composite 
R Accumulated number of capital varieties (and of firms and patents) 
H
RX  Production of new ideas 
ViK  Capital variety i 
kviP  User cost index of capital variety i 
H
RP  Price index of the patent 
H
kiX  Output of variety firm i delivered to the domestic market 
W
kiX  Output of variety firm i delivered to the export market 
H
kiP  Domestic market price index of variety i 
W
kP  World market price index of varieties 
Pkv User cost index of the variety-capital composite 
0U  Discounted period utilities of a representative consumer 
d  Consumption of a representative consumer 
PD Consumer price index 
W0  Consumer’s current non-human wealth + present value of labor income + net transfers 
λ Marginal utility of wealth 
D Aggregate consumption 
n Annual population growth rate 
Di Demand for consumer good i 
VDj Aggregate expenditure on CES aggregate j 
0.iω  Budget share of good i in CES aggregate j in period 0 
gs Growth rate 
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B.6 Parameter list 
τ =0.009 Factor productivity change through international spillovers 
s=0.83 Scale elasticity 
θ=1.2 Transformation parameter between deliveries to the domestic and the foreign market 
σc=1.5 Elasticity of substitution between variety-capital and other ordinary capital 
σkv=5 Uniform elasticity of substitution applying to all pairs of capital varieties 
s1=0.4 Elasticity of domestic spillovers, j=G, E 
kim =1.25 Markup factor for variety firm i 
ρ=0.04 Consumer’s rate of time preferences 
σd=0.3 Intertemporal elasticity of substitution 
σ=0.5 Elasticity of substitution between the two consumer goods 
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Appendix C 
Figure C.1: The nested structure of the production technologies 
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Figure C.2: The nested structure of the production technologies for the gas power sectors 
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Appendix D 
Figure D.1 Consumption 
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Appendix E 
The price of electricity from the gas power producers 
The cost structure in the model gives a producer price of electricity delivered from the CCS 
gas power industry of US$0.075/kWh in 2002. From the gas power industry without CCS the 
price is US$0.047/kWh. The producer base price of electricity delivered to the market in the 
calibrated year is US$0.03/kWh. So to keep production levels in the gas power industries at 
the calibrated level, their producer prices are subsidized in 2002 with US$0.045/kWh and 
US$0.017/kWh for production with and without CCS, respectively. These subsidies are 
phased out during the first 10 years. As the demand for electricity increases in this period, the 
gas power industries manage to produce without subsidies at the end of the period. 
The costs presented here are sensitive to the price of gas. The model is calibrated to a gas 
price of US$0.15/m3 in 2002. For a higher gas price, both gas power industries face higher 
costs; however, the cost difference between the industries is smaller for a higher gas price, 
since the gas factor input share is smaller for the CCS plants. 
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Appendix F 
Table F.1 Constant carbon tax regime 
Table F.1: Long-run effects of different time profiles of subsidies for environmental R&D, 
given as percentage changes from the constant carbon tax regime in 2070: 
Innovation policy  
Constant Falling Increasing 
Production of general patents –0.8 –0.7 –0.8 
Production of environmental patents 187.6 164.8 173.6 
General knowledge stock –0.3 –0.3 –0.2 
Environmental knowledge stock 38.4 70.5 43.7 
Production of general capital varieties –0.3 –0.3 –0.3 
Production of environmental capital 
varieties 
58.4 65.6 43.2 
Production of gas power without CCS –9.5 –10.8 –7.1 
Production of gas power with CCS 5.8 6.6 4.2 
Production of main final goods –0.02 –0.02 –0.02 
Production of power-intensive goods 0.27 0.45 0.20 
Nominal wage rate 0.04 0.04 0.03 
Electricity price –1.00 –1.15 –0.74 
GDP 0.056 0.063 0.041 
Welfare 0.0300 0.0322 0.0240 
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Table F.2 Policy analysis with exogenous emissions and endogenous carbon taxes 
Table F.2: Long-run effects of different time profiles of subsidies for environmental R&D, 
given as percentage changes in the emissions regimes in 2070: 
 
Innovation policy  
Constant Falling Increasing 
Carbon reduction regime → High Low High Low High Low 
Production of general patents –0.8 –0.8 –0.7 –0.7 –0.8 –0.8 
Production of environmental patents 188.4 200.8 166.3 159.3 174.0 198.3 
General knowledge stock –0.3 –0.3 –0.3 –0.3 –0.2 –0.2 
Environmental knowledge stock 61.3 63.5 71.0 68.7 43.8 47.0 
Production of general capital varieties –0.3 –0.3 –0.3 –0.3 –0.2 –0.3 
Production of environmental capital 
varieties 
58.6 60.6 66.0 63.9 43.3 46.5 
Production of gas power without CCS –10.4 –2.7 –12.0 –3.0 –7.7 –2.1 
Production of gas power with CCS 5.7 6.5 6.6 7.0 4.2 4.9 
Production of main final goods –0.02 –0.02 –0.02 –0.02 –0.02 –0.02 
Production of power-intensive goods 0.23 0.38 0.27 0.42 0.17 0.28 
Nominal wage rate 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.03 
Electricity price  –1.01 –0.82 –1.16 –0.89 –0.74 –0.62 
GDP 0.057 0.054 0.064 0.056 0.041 0.041 
Welfare 0.0302 0.0270 0.0326 0.0276 0.0241 0.0224 
 
